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Abstract 
 The purpose of this study was to replicate and extend recent findings in the 
functional contextual literature by 1) establishing complex deictic relational responding 
skills in 3 persons diagnosed with Schizophrenia and mild-moderate Mental Retardation 
and 2) assessing generalization through pre and post-instructional measures of Social 
Anhedonia and Theory of Mind functioning. Results suggest that increasingly complex 
levels of deictic relational responses were acquired and mastered by all 3 participants and 
that generalization extended to the Deceptive Container Task (ToM levels 4 & 5) and 
Hinting Task. Support is provided for the notion that perspective taking skills might be 
shaped through operant conditioning of deictic frames and that acquisition of these skills 
may generalize to novel stimuli and settings. 
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Introduction 
According to the National Institute of Mental Health (2009), Schizophrenia is a 
brain disorder that occurs in approximately 1% of the general population and is 
associated with several genes and environmental influences. A DSM IV-TR diagnosis of 
Schizophrenia may occur when 6 criterion are met: A) presentation of two or more 
characteristic symptoms (delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly 
disorganized or catatonic behavior, negative symptoms) for a significant portion of time 
during a 1-month period, B) social/occupational dysfunction, C) duration of at least 6 
months D) Schizoaffective and Mood Disorder exclusion, E) substance/general medical 
condition exclusion, and F) exclusion of a relationship to a Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder. (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  
Social disinterest, a Criterion A negative symptom, is considered a defining 
dimension of Schizophrenia (American Psychiatric Association; World Health 
Organization, 1992). Corcoran, Mercer, and Frith (1995) found that those with negative 
symptoms as well as those with paranoid delusions and related positive symptoms scored 
significantly lower than controls when inferring the mental states of others. In fact, social 
anhedonia is thought to be a main factor in the prediction of onset in Schizophrenia 
research, even when it is not associated with other dimensions of schizotypy (Gooding, 
Tallent, & Matts, 2005). Others have suggested that inaccurate social perceptions persist 
during remission phases and may well contribute to reemergence of psychotic symptoms 
(Hyronemus, Penn, Corrigan, & Martin, 1998). In a prospective investigation, Schiffman 
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et al. (2004) observed that children who scored low on perspective taking measures were 
at a higher risk of developing a Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorder than those who attained 
high scores. This topic has received considerable attention from cognitive and 
developmental psychologists in recent decades, leading to a nativist theory which 
examines age as the dependent variable in the acquisition of perspective taking skills. 
Theory of Mind 
Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute beliefs, intentions, or 
emotions (i.e., mental states) to the self or to others in order to predict or explain their 
behavior (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and therefore plays an important role in everyday 
activities that require an accurate understanding of another person’s perspective. ToM, as 
put forth in the neurodevelopmental literature, postulates 5 levels (Howlin, Baron-Cohen, 
& Hadwin, 1999) in understanding perspective and takes a nativist developmental 
approach in explaining the acquisition of perspective taking skills via maturation (i.e., the 
passage of time as the independent variable).  
Levels of Theory of Mind  
There are five general levels in the development of ToM ability that range from 
simple visual perspective taking to predicting actions on the basis of true and false belief 
(Howlin et al., 1999). As the levels represent increasing complexity, each level is 
dependent on adequate performance on all previous levels. In addition, there are at least 
two abilities seen to be foundational to all aspects of theory of mind; the first, mental-
physical distinction, includes the ability to identify what someone is able to do physically 
(e.g., actually pet a dog) as opposed to a thought (e.g. imagining someone petting a dog). 
The second basic ability is to identify distinctions between appearance and reality (e.g., a 
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candle that is in the shape of an apple). Following from this foundation are the five levels 
of ToM ability.  
Level 1 simple visual perspective taking. People are said to act on the principle 
that different individuals can have different views of the same situation or object. For 
example, with a two-sided card placed between two individuals, one person can see only 
one side while the other person can only see the other side. Each side of the card has a 
different picture on it (e.g., ace of spades & decorative design).  
Level 2 complex visual perspective taking. This is based on the principle that 
people can see the same thing differently. For example, if an item is placed between two 
individuals sitting opposite one another, one person will see the front of the item and the 
other will see the reverse. In the language of ToM, these first two levels are collectively 
referred to as first-order because they involve the simple attribution of a mental state to 
another person (Baron-Cohen, 2004).  
Second Order 
Levels 3-5 in the development of ToM may be collectively referred to as second-
order because they involve the more complex understanding that a person can have 
mental states about another person’s mental states (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & 
Cohen, 2004).  
Level 3 seeing leads to knowing. Seeing leads to knowing is based on the 
principle that people only know things that they have seen (Taylor, 1988). Therefore, an 
individual who cannot track what another person may or may not know is unlikely to 
engage in continued social interaction, or have the ability to determine whether the other 
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person is being truthful or dishonest. At level 3, a true belief is established through the 
delivery of information from another source. 
Level 4 true belief. This aspect extends the level 3 attribution of seeing leads to 
knowing by predicting the actions of another based on the information provided by 
another. The ability to engage in true belief tasks based on the rules of access (seeing or 
not) are also believed to be important pre-requisites to the attribution of false belief. 
Whether or not true belief as a prerequisite to false belief is actually necessary is unclear.  
Level 5 false belief. False belief involves the principle that you can predict 
actions on the basis of another’s false belief and can become aware that previous beliefs 
may have been false (Howlin et al., 1999). In instances in which representations or 
beliefs are discriminated as incorrect or false (e.g., events may have occurred without a 
person’s knowledge) the individual can alter the belief about these events. In other words, 
given additional information about events not experienced, individuals are able to modify 
their belief such that it is in line with what has occurred. Moreover, the individual can 
recognize that prior to acquiring the new information he/she was behaving on the basis of 
a false belief.  
ToM Applications in Perspective Taking and Schizophrenia 
ToM literature suggests that people diagnosed with Schizophrenia have 
difficulties in sequencing false-belief stories (Langdon et al., 1997), understanding 
metaphors in proverbs (Brüne & Bodenstein, 2005), as well as ironic and metaphorical 
statements (Langdon, Davies, & Coltheart, 2002; Mo, Su, Chan, & Liu, 2008), 
understanding humorous pictures (Corcoran, Cahill, & Frith, 1997), and inferring 
intentions (Corcoran etal., 1995; Sarfati & Hardy- Baylé, 1999). Overall, ToM research 
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has suggested that people diagnosed with Schizophrenia have deficits in inferring mental 
states such as the beliefs, desires, and intentions of others (perspective taking). Some 
authors have considered that difficulties in perspective taking skills constitute the core 
element of mental states attribution deficits in Schizophrenia (Langdon & Coltheart, 
2001; Langdon, Coltheart, Ward, & Catts, 2001) and a recent meta-analysis of  ToM 
literature suggested that deficits may well persist during remission phases (Bora, Yucel, 
& Pantelis, 2009). While the majority of research performed in this area has been 
undertaken from a neurodevelopmental standpoint, recent developments in the field of 
Behavior Analysis have led to inquiry from a functional contextual approach to 
perspective taking (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004; Villatte, 
Monestès, McHugh, Freixa i Baqué, & Loas, 2010a; Weil, Hayes, & Capurro, 2011). 
Relational Frame Theory 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT) is a functional contextual account of human 
language and cognition based on the operant scientific system put forth by B.F. Skinner. 
This view approaches all behavior as being influenced by a history of antecedent and 
consequential environmental stimuli which comes to bear on the current context. 
Cognitive and developmental psychologists, language pathologists, and other non-
behavioral scientific fields have attempted to account for verbal behavior with mentalist 
models, such as ToM, that do not serve to predict or control verbal behavior but rather, in 
the end, might “allay curiosity and bring inquiry to a stop” (Skinner, 1974). Skinner 
defined verbal behavior as behavior that is reinforced through the mediation of another 
who is specifically trained to do so (Skinner, 1957).  
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The definition of verbal behavior provided by RFT differs from that of Skinner by 
requiring, in addition to Skinner’s criterion, that in order to be considered verbal, a 
behavior must participate in a relational frame (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). 
A relational frame is defined by Hayes et al. (2001, p. 33) as: 
“A specific class of arbitrarily applicable relational responding 
that shows the contextually controlled qualities of mutual 
entailment, combinatorial mutual entailment, and transformation 
of stimulus functions; is due to a history of relational responding 
relevant to the contextual cues involved; and is not solely based on 
direct non-relational training with regard to other particular 
stimuli of interest, nor solely to nonarbitrary characteristics of 
either the stimuli or the relation between them.” 
 
Although the development of language and cognition are phenomena which are 
not yet satisfactorily understood, RFT provides the tools necessary for an empirical 
evaluation of complex cognitive constructs such as perspective taking. 
Mutual Entailment 
Relational framing begins with direct contingencies for neutral stimuli and can be 
trained via operant conditioning (Törneke, 2010). That is, a neutral stimulus (B) can be 
trained as functionally equivalent to another stimulus (A) by reinforcing the desired 
response to a question such as “Stimulus A is the same as?” When presented with 
stimulus A and asked this question in the presence of stimuli B/C/D, the participant will 
choose stimulus B. What we find in addition, is that the reverse selection will also occur. 
When presented with stimulus B and asked to choose its equivalent from stimuli A/C/D, 
the participant will choose stimulus A although this relation has never been directly 
trained. The relation from B-A is derived through mutual entailment and if we introduce 
a third stimulus (C) and again train equivalence to stimulus A, we will find the same 
results with A-C as we do with stimulus A-B. 
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Combinatorial Mutual Entailment. 
In addition to the two relations that have been trained (A-B, A-C) and the 
complementary relations, which, are in turn derived through mutual entailment (B-A, C-
A), a process known as combinatorial mutual entailment establishes a derived 
equivalence relationship between stimulus B-C and C-B. In order for this to occur, one 
must be able to take the position of stimulus B in order to understand it’s relation to 
stimulus A and likewise, take the position of stimulus C in order to understand it’s 
relation to stimulus A. Through combinatorial mutual entailment, if stimulus B is 
equivalent to stimulus A and stimulus C is also equivalent to stimulus A, then stimulus B 
and C acquire a derived equivalence relationship. Combining previously learned relations 
is thought to be the basis for the development of complex human language behavior such 
as metaphor and sarcasm because these processes require that a person is able to take 
different perspectives (Hayes et al., 2001). 
 
Figure 1. Components of a Relational Frame. 
In review, by training two equivalence relations (A-B, A-C), four derived 
equivalence relations are established (B-A, C-A, B-C, C-B). Two derived relations are 
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established via mutual entailment (B-A, C-A) and two derived relations are established 
via combinatorial mutual entailment (B-C, C-B). A total of six equivalence relations 
develop as a result of only two directly trained equivalence relations (figure 1). 
Three types of relational frames that seem to be important in the development of 
language are coordination: as described in the previous equivalence example. 
Opposition: the simplest relation in which some derived relations differ from the original 
trained relations. If stimulus A is opposite to stimulus B and stimulus A is opposite to 
stimulus C, then we can derive two relations of opposition via mutual entailment (B-A, 
C-A) but also two relations of equivalence via combinatorial mutual entailment (B-C, C-
B). Distinction: the simplest form of relational frame in which some relations go 
unspecified. If stimulus A is different than stimulus B and stimulus A is also different 
than stimulus C, then two relations (B-A, C-A) are derived via mutual entailment but we 
are unable to derive the remaining relations (B-C, C-B) via combinatorial mutual 
entailment because the relationship between stimulus B and C remains ambiguous.  
Other relational frames that might be established through derived relations are: 
distinction (Roche & Barnes, 1996), comparison (Dymond & Barnes, 1995; O’Hora, 
Roche, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2002), hierarchy (Griffee & Dougher, 2002), analogy 
(Barnes, Hegarty, & Smeets, 1997; Lipkens & Hayes, 2009; Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2004), temporality (O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2004; O’Hora et 
al., 2002), and perspective, or deictic relational responding as it is referred to in RFT 
literature (McHugh et., 2004).  
Contextual cues help to predict reinforcement for particular relational responses 
and there are two types of contextual cues referred to in RFT. The first is a relational cue 
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or Crel (pronounced “see real”). This is a type of contextual cue that specifies the relation 
between stimuli and the type of relational response that is likely to receive reinforcement. 
Some examples of Crel are “equal to”, “greater than”, and “less than”. Cfunc (pronounced 
“see funk”) is a type of contextual cue that specifies the stimulus functions to be 
transformed in a relational frame. For example, if we say that “He is a rock”, then “is a 
rock” serves as a Cfunc for the person’s stimulus functions to transform and take on certain 
stimulus functions that are often paired with rocks (i.e. hard or not easily changed). 
Known as metaphor, statements like this are just one example of how arbitrarily 
applicable relational responding can account for complex and novel human language 
extensions originally described by Skinner.  
Transfer of Stimulus Functions 
Using the equivalence (a frame of coordination) relation described previously as 
an example, it is now possible to alter the function of each stimulus in the frame by 
introducing a fourth stimulus with a different function (ex. anxiety producing) to stimuli 
A, B, and C. When stimulus D, having an aversive property, is introduced and trained as 
equivalent to say, stimulus B, the result is a trained aversive equivalence function 
transferred from stimulus D-B and a derived aversive equivalence function between 
stimuli B-D. As a result, when stimulus B again comes in contact with stimulus A or C, 
the aversive function will transfer to both remaining stimuli through derived relations 
(Törneke, 2010).  
A Relational Frame Account of the Self and Perspective taking 
In behavioral terms, the self has been described by Lattal (2012) as 1) the 
collective repertoire of behavior resulting from a unique genetic and behavioral history. 
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2) A specific behavioral repertoire under stimulus control, such that multiple selves may 
be described. 3) A verbal response describing aspects of one’s behavioral repertoire. 4) A 
dependent variable: the outcome of contingencies of reinforcement and punishment. 5) 
An independent variable: a potential source of control over an individual’s behavior. 
Perspective taking ability is thought to be critical to the development of the self. 
In RFT, perspective taking is argued to emerge from deictic relational frames 
(Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan, 2001; McHugh et al., 2004). Deictic 
frames are established by demonstration and cannot be traced to formal dimensions of the 
environment because they are relative to the speaker (McHugh et al., 2004). That is to 
say, whereas bigger/smaller relations have formal counterparts in the environment and 
learning histories most likely involve a reliance on formal dimensions initially; deictic 
relations do not. The primary dimensions involved are spatial, temporal, and perspective 
in relation to the speaker. Each is said to emerge due to a history of asking and 
responding to questions such as “What am I doing?” and “Where were you yesterday?” 
While the formal characteristics of questions like these may be consistent across many 
different situations, inevitably the situations themselves will vary. What is consistent 
across different events are the relational properties of I-You (allocentric), Here-There 
(egocentric), and Now-Then (egocentric) (McHugh et al., 2004).  
These particular relational frames participate in all levels of ToM complexity. For 
instance, levels 1 and 2 involve simple and complex visual perspective taking. During 
relational training the principle of different people see different things is targeted. As 
such, contextual control of the I-You relational frame is being established. That is, given 
11 
 
a statement regarding some visual stimuli, the correct response is evoked by the 
contextual cues of I and You in the statement.  
Level 3 involves training on the principle of seeing leads to knowing. The 
relational protocol involves continued training with the I-You relational frame to increase 
the flexibility of the relational class, and indirectly targets the temporal relations of Now-
Then. For example, when discussing the location of an object, references to time and 
personal indicators are often used as in, “I saw the key this morning (Then) so I know 
(Now) where it is.” or “You did not see the key (Then) so (You) do not know (Now) 
where it is.”  
Relational training at level 4 involves the acquisition of contextual control of the 
deictic frames. A common exemplar for true belief involves a scenario where a car is 
placed beside a boat, and in another scene, an identical car is placed beside a plane. A 
child is then provided with the following true belief story: “This morning, you saw the 
car next to the boat but you did not see the car next to the plane”. The child is then asked, 
“Where do you think the car is? Why do you think it is near the boat? Where will you go 
to get the car? Why will you go to the boat?” The correct conclusions from this scenario 
involve the knowledge that one will only know what one has seen, and will act on this 
basis. Although Levels 3 and 4 of understanding informational states appear to cover the 
attribution of true belief to the self and others, these abilities are also believed to be 
important pre-requisites to the attribution of false belief (Howlin et al., 1999).  
Level 5 involves further training on the complexity and flexibility of deictic 
relational frames involving false belief tasks. The principle covered here involves 
predicting actions on the basis of false belief as well as becoming aware that previous 
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beliefs may have been false and thus providing the context to alter the previous response 
to a true belief. Accomplishment of these tasks requires an appreciation that observation 
from a specified perspective may change when seen from another perspective. As 
previously mentioned, all require observations made from a specified perspective or point 
of view, defined by person, place, and time. From an RFT point of view, that sense of 
perspective is the result of deictic frames along those three dimensions (I-You, Here-
There, Now-Then). 
Relational Frame Applications in Perspective Taking 
Based on the Barnes-Holmes et al. (2001) perspective taking protocol, McHugh et 
al. (2004) developed a shortened protocol in order to assess the acquisition of skills via 
the deictic relations of I-You, Here-There and Now-Then. Relations were assessed in 
simple, reversed, and double reversed tasks across 56 (originally 256) total trials. The 
study determined that accuracy on deictic perspective taking tasks increased as a function 
of age (3-5 years (early childhood); 6-8 years (middle childhood); 9-11 years (late 
childhood); 12-14 years (adolescence); and 18–30 years (adulthood)) and that levels of 
accuracy appeared to decrease as a function of relational complexity. Overall, 
participants performed with higher levels of accuracy in simple deictic trials when 
compared to reversed trials. The findings  from this and subsequent studies support ToM 
literature which designates age as the independent variable in the acquisition of 
perspective taking skills, acting on the basis of true/false belief (McHugh, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2003b), and acting for the purpose of deception (McHugh, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2003c).  
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Proponents of RFT have since developed deictic relational responding training 
that has been shown to accelerate the development of these repertoires in typically 
developing children (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2003a). Rehfeldt, 
Dillen, Ziomek, and Kowalchuk (2007) also suggested that two typically functioning 
children ages 9 and 10 acquired perspective taking skills through reinforced multiple 
exemplars. A limitation to the study was that the researchers did not assess external 
validity in generalizing to novel tasks. The study was also the first to show that children 
with high-functioning Autism Spectrum Disorders scored lower on each level of deictic 
perspective taking through an automated Barnes-Holmes protocol. Heagle and Rehfeldt 
(2006), utilized an extended and automated version of the Barnes-Holmes protocol to 
reinforce three normal functioning children of ages 6, 8, and 11 years to generalize 
simple, reversed, and double-reversed perspective taking to real world stimuli and 
responses. In addition, Weil et al. (2011) demonstrated that deictic relational frames can 
be shaped as operant behavior in typically functioning children age 4-5 years and that 
reversed and double-reversed perspective taking acquisition correlated with increases in 
scoring on the ToM false-belief Deceptive Container Task. This was the first relational 
frame study to asses ToM task performance as a pre/post-training measure. 
The literature suggests that when deficits in deictic perspective taking tasks are 
found, acquisition may be facilitated through reinforced multiple exemplar training. 
Moreover, these findings have encouraged research in the area of Schizophrenia by 
suggesting that perspective taking skills might be remediated in the same fashion. 
14 
 
Deictic Relations and Schizophrenia 
In a series of studies performed by Villatte et al. (2008, 2010a, 2010b), the 
McHugh et al. (2004) protocol was employed to determine if persons with high levels of 
Social Anhedonia and Schizophrenia exhibit deficits in deictic perspective taking tasks.  
Villatte et al. (2008) utilized an automated version of the McHugh et al. (2004) 
protocol to assess relational responding in 30 nonclinical young adults (age 18-21) with 
high levels of Social Anhedonia. The protocol included 62 trials, each of which differed 
from the others depending on the deictic relation it addressed (I-You, Here-There or 
Now-Then) and the level of relational complexity assigned (8 simple, 36 reversed, and 18 
double reversed) for a total of eight trial-types (simple I-You, simple Here-There, simple 
Now-Then, reversed I-You, reversed Here-There, reversed Now-Then, double reversed I-
You/Here-There, double reversed Here-There/Now-Then). Villatte et al. found that 
socially anhedonic participants scored lower than a control group on the more complex 
(double-reversed) relational responding tasks which involved the deictic relation of I-You 
and that performance on the deictic relational responding protocol predicted accuracy on 
an established ToM exercise which involves identifying the intent of indirect speech 
known as the Hinting Task (see Corcoran et al., 1995).  
Villatte et al. (2010a), study 1, employed a protocol consisting of 48 true/false 
ToM trials in order to assess deficits in attributing a belief to the self or to another (12 
true-belief for self, 12 false-belief for self, 12 true-belief for another, 12 false-belief for 
another) in 30 first-year Psychology students with Social Anhedonia. The study found 
that those with scores at or above two standard deviations on the Revised Social 
Anhedonia Scale (RSAS) (Eckblad, Chapman, Chapman, & Mishlove, 1982) performed 
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more poorly than controls on relational responding tasks that involved reversing the I-
You frame when attributing a belief (true or false) to another. Overall, experimental 
participants produced 75% more errors on true-belief (ToM level 4) tasks and 300% more 
errors on false-belief tasks (ToM level 5). No differences were found between groups on 
tasks that involved attribution of a belief to the self. These findings support those of 
Villatte et al. (2008) in that participants with high levels of Social Anhedonia appeared to 
exhibit deficits in taking the perspective of another during complex deictic relational 
responding tasks.  
Villatte et al. (2010a), study 2, compared performance, on the same tasks as study 
1, by 15 patients (ages 22-53) diagnosed with Schizophrenia according to ICD-10 (World 
Health Organization, 1992). The number of tasks was reduced by half as compared to 
study 1 due to hospitalization constraints and resulted in 24 true/false trials for the 
purpose of assessing deficits in attributing a belief to another or to the self (6 true-belief 
for self, 6 false-belief for self, 6 true-belief for another, 6 false-belief for another). The 
study reported that experimental participants scored lower than controls in tasks that 
required attributing belief to another (reversal of I-You frame) and were less accurate in 
attribution of a false-belief (as compared to true-belief) to the self or another (supporting 
ToM reports by Brune, 2005 & Sprong, Schothorst, Vos, Hox, & Van Engeland, 2007). 
In contrast, accuracy of controls did not differ across trial-types. Response latencies were 
also assessed and resulted in the finding that subjects with high levels of Social 
Anhedonia were as fast in responding to the tasks as control subjects. This finding 
suggests that impulsivity, often exhibited by people with Schizophrenia, is unlikely to 
account for increased levels of error on perspective taking tasks in this population. This 
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also suggests that neuroleptic medication side effects did not have a significant effect on 
subject’s performance in perspective taking. It is also unlikely that memory deficits 
account for increased errors on longer tasks because tasks were left on screen for as long 
as participants needed. These findings lend further support to the hypothesis that high 
levels of Social Anhedonia lead to less practice in perspective taking and thus, deficits 
emerge. It is also quite possible that Social Anhedonia is reinforced by its consequences, 
thus exacerbating the condition. While Villatte et al. found that deficits in attributing a 
false belief to the self were present in patients with Schizophrenia (study 2), the same did 
not apply to those with Social Anhedonia alone (study 1). This finding suggests that low 
levels of social interaction can be implicated in the impairment of understanding 
another’s point of view but perhaps not in the understanding that people can act on the 
basis of a false-belief.  
In a study published the same year, Villatte et al. (2010b) assessed relational 
responding in 15 patients (ages 22-53) diagnosed with Schizophrenia, according to ICD-
10 (World Health Organization, 1992). The protocol included 42 trials, each of which 
again differed from the others depending on the deictic relation it addressed and the level 
of relational complexity (8 simple, 20 reversed, and 14 double reversed) assigned. This 
study found that the experimental group scored significantly lower than the control group 
on all reversed trial types (I-You, Here-There, Now-Then). While the experimental group 
also scored lower on double-reversed trials, the deficit fell short of significance, although, 
it was hypothesized that significance would have been reached with a larger sample size. 
Similar to the findings of Villatte et al. (2008) performance on the deictic relational 
responding protocol again predicted accuracy on the ToM Hinting Task.  
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The current study trained deictic relational responding in 3 people diagnosed with 
Schizophrenia and mild-moderate Mental Retardation and the study took place at a local 
behavioral services company in Tampa, Florida. Once consent had been obtained, 
participants completed the Revised Social Anhedonia Scale and then tested for deficits in 
deictic relational responding and an attempt to remediate these skills then occurred 
through reinforced multiple exemplar training. The Deceptive Container Task (levels 4 
and 5) and the Hinting Task were employed as baseline ToM probes as well as post-
training probes for skill remediation.  This study is the first in the deictic relational 
responding literature to utilize a single-subject analysis to attempt remediation of 
perspective taking skills in Schizophrenia and also the first to address such deficits in a 
population of clients with mild-moderate Mental Retardation. 
Method 
Participants 
Screening confirmed that each of the 3 participants selected for the study met the 
following inclusion criteria: 1) a current diagnosis of Schizophrenia, 2) a diagnosis of 
mild-moderate Mental Retardation, 3) high scores on the Revised Social Anhedonia 
Scale, 4) deficits on the ToM tasks, and 5) deficits in deictic relational responding. 
Participant #1 was a 66 year old male who had diagnoses of Schizophrenia, 
Bipolar manic with psychotic features, and Mental Retardation. Prescription drugs related 
to these diagnoses were Abilify (atypical antipsychotic) and Carbamazepine 
(anticonvulsant/mood stabilizing). He had a long history of engaging in inappropriate 
sexual behavior towards children and vulnerable adults. Participant #2 was a 49 year old 
male diagnosed with Schizophrenia with auditory hallucinations and Mental Retardation. 
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Prescription drugs related to these diagnoses were Zyprexia and Risperdal (atypical 
antipsychotics). He had a history of engaging in inappropriate sexual behavior toward 
adult females. Participant #3 was a 47 year old male diagnosed with Schizophrenia with 
bizarre vocalizations and Mental Retardation. Prescription drugs related to these 
diagnoses were Zyprexia (atypical antipsychotic), Haldol (typical antipsychotic), Luvox 
(SSRI), and Depakote (anticonvulsant/mood stabilizing). He had a history of engaging in 
inappropriate sexual verbalizations toward adult females. 
 Following screening, an explanation of the relational responding protocol was 
provided to each potential participant in language appropriate for functioning level and a 
review period of 24 hours was allowed before obtaining written informed consent from 
each. Ongoing assessment of consent was performed before the onset of each study 
session and participants were made aware that they may opt out of the study at any time 
and that this choice would have no affect on their regular treatment. Participants did not 
receive any form of monetary compensation. 
Setting 
 Study sessions were conducted in private closed-door rooms at each of the client’s 
homes or Adult Day Training (ADT) facility. The rooms varied in size across client 
homes but contained at least two chairs and one table. Participants sat facing the 
experimenter in order to facilitate training and every attempt was made to avoid 
interruptions. 
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Design 
A within-subject multiple probe design was combined with a multiple baseline 
across behaviors design which allowed for evaluation of acquisition across levels of 
deictic relational complexity (Simple, Reversed, and Double Reversed relations). 
Data Collection 
 Sessions were approximately 10 minutes in duration, attempted twice daily, and 
were typically conducted on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Study duration ranged 
from 8-10 weeks per participant. Data were reported as the percentage of correct 
responses per session and were calculated by dividing correct trials by total trials and 
multiplying by 100. Interobserver Agreement (IOA) was conducted by a master’s level 
graduate student via audio recordings of sessions. IOA percentage was calculated on a 
trial by trial basis by dividing the number of trials with agreement by the number of trials 
with agreement plus disagreement, then multiplying by 100. IOA was calculated across 
33.1% of all sessions (including 33.3% of post-training probes) and resulted in 95.8% 
agreement.  
Procedures 
Testing and Training 
Each participant was exposed to the same order of testing and training.  The 
general course and sequence of the study progressed from baseline assessments to 
intervention training with post-training probes conducted before advancing to higher 
complexity tasks: 
1. Baseline probes  
 Revised Social Anhedonia Scale 
 ToM (Deceptive Container & Hinting Tasks) 
 RFT (All deictic complexity levels) 
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2. Deictic training (Simple level) 
 Post deictic training probes  
 Mastery (Simple) 
 Baseline (Reversed and Double Reversed) 
3. Deictic training (Reversed level) 
 Post deictic training probes 
 Mastery (Simple and Reversed) 
 Baseline (Double Reversed) 
 1st post-training ToM probes (Deceptive Container & Hinting 
Tasks) 
 Revised Social Anhedonia Scale 
4. Deictic training (Double Reversed level) 
 Post deictic training probe 
 Mastery (All complexity levels) 
 2nd post-training (Deceptive Container & Hinting Tasks) 
 Revised Social Anhedonia Scale 
 
Theory of Mind testing.  Levels four and five theory of mind testing consisted of 
32 scenarios with accompanying true/false questions. These scenarios were read to 
participants from note cards in random order. Scenarios were modeled around the ToM 
Deceptive Container Task used by Villatte et al. (2010a) and were divided equally into 4 
categories: true belief attribution to oneself, false belief attribution to oneself, true belief 
attribution to another, and finally, false belief attribution to another. An equal number of 
true and false answers for each type of attribution were maintained. Three object sets 
appeared in the scenarios: a cigarette pack and crayons, a crayon box and cigarettes, and 
a chalk box and pencils. These items were selected in order to allow for false belief (level 
5) questions because one would normally expect to find cigarettes in a cigarette box, 
crayons in a crayon box, and chalk in a chalk box. For example, the following scenario 
was read to participants from a note card: 
“If I put the pencils in a chalk box and you are not here,  
you would think the chalk box contains chalk” 
 
Participants then received a prompt to answer “true” or “false”. 
21 
 
The preceding example is one of false belief attribution to oneself because, being absent 
from the setting, the participant would normally expect to find chalk in a chalk box and 
so the correct answer to the question is true. Answering this question correctly requires 
knowing that one can act in accordance with false beliefs. 
The ToM Hinting Task was modeled on that employed by Corcoran et al. (1995) 
and Villatte et al. (2010b) to assess ToM impairments in Schizophrenia. Ten short scenes 
were read to each participant. Each scene described an interaction between two characters 
in a socially relevant everyday situation and the participant was then asked to clarify what 
he believed the character meant by what was said in each interaction. For example: 
“Stephanie says to her friend Nicole: ‘I can’t afford the repairs of 
my car. Could you lend me some money?’ Nicole answers: ‘I have 
to have my car repaired too.’” 
 
The participant was then asked: 
“What does Nicole really mean when she says this?” 
 
A second hint was then provided regardless of the answer to the first hint: 
 
“Nicole then says: The repairs to my car are going to be very 
expensive.” 
 
The participant was again asked: 
“What does Nicole really mean when she says this?” 
 
Participants were able to score a maximum of 3 points per scenario (2 points for a correct 
first answer, 1 point for a correct second answer, and 0 points for an incorrect answer).  
The previously mentioned studies employed this cue and second opportunity to 
answer in an attempt to avoid a floor effect in participants who find the task difficult. 
Participants in the Villatte et al. (2010b) study produced correct answers after the first 
question on 63% of trials (77% after the cue and 2
nd 
question) and therefore, a floor effect 
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was not anticipated in this study. In addition, previous control and experimental 
participants benefited equally from this supplemental information. Despite these data, the 
current study also incorporated a cue and an additional question in order to maintain 
uniformity. 
Deictic relational testing and training. The protocol used in the current study 
consisted of the shortened perspective taking protocol employed in the developmental 
profile of perspective taking reported by McHugh et al. (2004). The protocol consisted of 
fifty six perspective taking tasks that target responding in accordance with the three 
perspective taking frames of I-You, Here-There and Now-Then across three levels of 
complexity (Simple, Reversed, & Double Reversed). Specifics of baseline probes, 
instructional probes and post reinforcement probes are discussed below.     
This experiment made use of a table top procedure that necessarily included a 
limited set of stimuli. The importance of utilizing a limited set of stimuli was to ensure 
acquisition in a timely fashion and to evaluate whether limited multiple exemplars would 
promote generality of complex relational responding. That is, utilizing small samples of 
stimuli in each type of relational frame should function to establish a relational operant.  
Each of the specific statements was presented by the researcher and read from an index-
sized card. The correct answer was in parenthesis and printed at 20% grayscale to 
minimize the chance that the participant was able to see it. 
Pre-instructional testing procedures. All pre-instructional probes (baseline) 
contained a random presentation of all three deictic relational frames across all three 
complexity levels. A total of 18 trials (6 per complexity level) were included. The testing 
procedure was conducted without feedback and in the absence of reinforcement. As the 
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design employed in this study was a multiple probe baseline design across levels of 
complexity, baseline testing sessions were conducted throughout on complexity levels 
that were not yet involved in training. Whenever this occurred, only deictic relational 
frames from those complexity levels not yet involved in training were evaluated. For 
example, given that training was in progress at the simple complexity level and a baseline 
probe was conducted—that baseline probe included trials comprised of deictic relational 
frames from the Reversed and Double Reversed levels of complexity only (total of 12 
trials).  
Training procedures. As previously mentioned, the study employed a table-top 
procedure that included various questions read from cards (by the experimenter) which 
made reference to the deictic relational frames involved. All training sessions included 12 
trials of the deictic frames at the respective complexity level randomly presented to the 
participant. Exceptions to this occurred when a participant required training on one 
specific deictic frame. Responses to these 12 trials produced reinforcement (social 
positive) or extinction + general feedback (“no, I’m sorry, I would be in the blue chair”). 
Two sessions were conducted during the vast majority of days with a break in between.  
Therefore, each day, a maximum of two sessions was implemented. The decision to 
continue past the first session was left to the participants.  Mastery criterion during the 
training phase for any relational frame was 80%. 
During training, the protocol did not include randomized presentations of 
complexity level, but did include mixed trials involving the three deictic relations at a 
particular complexity level. Specifically, the training protocol was divided into the three 
levels of relational complexity (Simple, Reversed and Double Reversed relations), within 
24 
 
which trials took two forms:  first, given adequate performance on all deictic relational 
frames, each session involved 12 trials (4 I-You, 4 Here-There, 4 Now-Then).  Second, at 
any point that it became clear the participant was struggling with one of the deictic 
relational frames, that frame was mass trialed (e.g., 12 trials of only Now-Then) and 
recombined with the other deictic relational frames as the participant mastered the 
material.   
Complexity level 1 involved responding in accordance with the perspective taking 
frames of I-You, Here-There, and Now-Then in simple presentations where the questions 
were focused on the relational frame as presented. To illustrate, if the trial involved the 
relational frame of I-You, stimuli were placed on the table and the questions were asked 
with respect to that particular frame and were presented such as: 
“I (Experimenter) have a green brick, and you (participant) have a 
red brick”. 
  
The participant was then asked: 
“Which brick do I have? Which brick do you have?” 
 
The order in which the I-You, Here-There, and Now-Then questions are presented was 
randomized across all trials in a training block.  
Complexity level 2 was procedurally the same as level 1; however, after stating 
the vignette and prior to asking the questions, the trainer provided a contextual cue which 
altered the correct response. To use the same example as above: 
“I have a green brick, and you have a red brick.” 
“If I was you and you were me.” 
“Which brick would I have? Which brick would you have?” 
 
In the statement “If I was you and you were me”, the I-You relation is explicitly reversed. 
Correct responses to these questions were based on this relational reversal and not on the 
Contextual Cue 
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actual possession of the bricks. In other words, the correct answers to the questions are "a 
red brick" (Experimenter) and "a green brick" (subject), respectively. This reversal was 
included in each of the relational frames. 
Complexity level 3 involved trials of the same type as described in the first two 
levels of complexity, however, each trial only included two of the three relations and both 
relations were reversed in each trial. In other words, the two separate trial types in this 
level consisted of either I-You/Here-There or Here-There/Now-Then combinations. Both 
of which were reversed by a contextual cue of: 
“If I am You and You are Me and If Now was Then and Then was 
Now.” 
This resulted in answers to Level 3 questions that were the same as those seen in Level 1 
(simple). That is, if you reverse an I-You relation and a Here-There relation, the response 
is the same as if the relations were not reversed at all.  
“I am here in the green chair and you are there in the yellow 
chair.” 
“And if I am you and you are me and if here is there and there is 
here.” 
“What chair are you in? What chair am I in?” 
 
The double reversed level of complexity evaluated 2 combinations of relational frames (I-
You/Here-There and Here-There/Now-Then).  
Post-instructional testing procedures. Following mastery of the deictic relational 
frames at any level of complexity, the participant was presented with trials containing 
deictic relational frames from the level of complexity just mastered randomly rotated 
with deictic frames from levels that had been previously mastered. That is, given mastery 
at the reversed level of complexity, a post-instructional probe included relational frames 
from both the simple (previously mastered) and the reversed levels of complexity.  The 
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participant was presented with 12 trials, randomly rotated that included questions from 
both the simple and reversed complexity levels; when conducted following acquisition of 
double reversed relations, the post-instructional probe included 18 randomly rotated trials 
from all levels of complexity (6 Simple, 6 Reversed, 6 Double-Reversed). Continuation 
of training into the next level of complexity required that the participant perform at 80% 
accuracy or better on unprompted, unreinforced probes.  
Programmed consequences. Each trial in the relational testing and training 
protocol included two questions (e.g., "Where am I sitting? Where are you sitting?"). A 
correct response required that the participant answer both questions correctly. A correct 
response to the trial (i.e., answering both questions correctly) resulted in the delivery of 
praise. Participants could earn a preferred reinforcer, as identified through self report, for 
meeting mastery criteria (80% correct responding). Participants #1 and 2 identified 
edibles (a box of ice cream bars & large can of ice tea, respectively) and Participant #3 
identified tangibles in the form of restrictive clothing (sports gear and rehabilitation 
braces) as his preferred reinforcer. Incorrect responses resulted in short and concise 
corrective feedback or 5s extinction for bizarre vocalizations. 
Results  
 Deficits in perspective taking were observed in all 3 participants on baseline ToM 
Deceptive Container Tasks including false belief attribution to oneself, true belief 
attribution to oneself, false belief attribution to another, true belief attribution to another, 
and the Hinting Task. Deficits were also indicated on all levels of deictic tasks (Simple, 
Reversed and Double Reversed) at baseline. Reinforced multiple exemplar training 
occurred for specific deictic relational tasks, at specific levels of complexity, and resulted 
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in increased accuracy in complex deictic relational responding. Finally, increased 
accuracy on all ToM tasks was observed across all participants after training at each 
complexity level of deictic relational responding. ToM task performance increases 
provide evidence to support the notion that training involving a limited set of stimuli can 
strengthen deictic relations as generalized operants and that deictic relational responding 
constitutes the foundation for perspective taking ability.  
Participant #1 
 Baseline scores for Participant #1 were first evaluated and yielded the following 
aggregate data: 50% (Simple), 50% (Reversed), and 17% (Double-Reversed). A second 
assessment of baseline performance yielded identical percentages. Training on Simple 
relations started with session three and continued for 12 sessions.  Both I-You and Here-
There relations were quickly acquired by Participant #1, however, Now-Then relations 
were difficult and required mass trial sessions. A post-instructional probe was conducted 
and resulted in 83% performance across the three Simple deictic relations.  
 After training for Simple relations, a baseline probe was conducted for both 
Reversed and Double Reversed relations. There was a decrease in Reversed performance 
to 33% (2/6).  Performance on Double-Reversal trials was shown to increase slightly to 
33% (2/6). 
28 
 
 
Figure 2. Deictic Training Participant #1 
 Training at the Reversed level of complexity commenced following the third 
baseline probe and continued for 12 sessions. As aggregate performance met criteria for 
80% or better to be probed, a post-instructional probe was conducted that resulted in 
100% correct responding.  
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Figure 3. Deceptive Container Task Participant #1 
 Following this probe, a final baseline was conducted with Double-Reversed 
relations. Relations at this level tested at 17% accuracy (1/6). Training on these two 
relations resulted in increased accurate responding at 92% (11/12). A post-instructional 
probe was conducted and Participant #1 responded at 100% (Simple), 67% (Reversed) 
and 75% (Double-Reversed). As a result, a return to the Reversed level tasks was deemed 
appropriate per protocol. Upon two consecutive Reversed level training sessions at 100% 
accuracy, a post-instructional probe was scored at 100% (Simple), 83% (Reversed), and 
17% (Double-Reversed). Figure 2 shows the results of deictic training for participant #1. 
 
Figure 4. Hinting Task & RSAS Assessments Participant #1 
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 Theory of Mind probes were conducted on three occasions (Baseline, Post-
Reversed, and Post-Double-Reversed). Evaluation of levels 4 (true belief) and 5 (false 
belief) were compared by employing the Deceptive Container Task and further 
generalization was assessed by examining performance on the Hinting Task.  On the first 
ToM probe, Participant #1’s ToM performance was 67% (82% at level 4 and 51% at 
level 5) across Deceptive Container Tasks and 40% on the Hinting Task. Following 
acquisition of Reversed deictic relations a second ToM probe was conducted with ToM 
accuracy increasing to 88% (94% at level 4 and 82% at level 5) across Deceptive 
Container Tasks and 50% on the Hinting Task.  A final ToM probe was conducted 
following the post-instructional mastery probe performance. Participant #1’s aggregate 
ToM accuracy was 94% (100% at level 4 and 88% at level 5) across Deceptive Container 
Tasks and 63% on the Hinting Task. Figure 3 shows the results of Deceptive Container 
Task probes for participant #1. 
 Finally, RSAS probes were also conducted on the same schedule as those 
performed for ToM and resulted in scores of 20/40 (Baseline), 14/40 (Post-Reversed), 
and 9/40 (Post-Double-Reversed). Figure 4 shows the results of Hinting Task and RSAS 
probes for participant #1. 
Participant #2 
 Baseline scores for Participant #2 were first evaluated and yielded the following 
aggregate data: 33% (Simple), 67% (Reversed), and 33% (Double-Reversed). A second 
assessment of baseline performance yielded similar percentages: 33% (Simple), 67% 
(Reversed), and 33% (Double-Reversed). Training on Simple relations started with 
session three and continued for 6 sessions.  Both I-You and Here-There relations were 
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quickly acquired by Participant #2, however, Now-Then relations were difficult and 
required a mass trial session. A post-instructional probe was conducted and resulted in 
83% performance across the three Simple deictic relations. 
 
Figure 5. Deictic Training Participant #2 
 After training for Simple relations, a baseline probe was conducted for both 
Reversed and Double Reversed relations. There was a decrease in Reversed performance 
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to 50% (3/6).  Performance on Double-Reversal trials was shown to increase slightly to 
67% (4/6). 
 
Figure 6. Deceptive Container Task Participant #2 
 Training at the Reversed level of complexity commenced following the third 
baseline probe and continued for 8 sessions. As aggregate performance met criteria for 
80% or better to be probed, a post-instructional probe was conducted that resulted in 
100% correct responding. Figure 5 shows the results of deictic training for participant #2. 
 Following this probe, a final baseline was conducted with Double-Reversed 
relations. Relations at this level tested at 17% accuracy (1/6). Training on these relations 
resulted in increased accurate responding at 83% (10/12). A post-instructional probe was 
conducted and Participant #2 responded at 100% (Simple), 67% (Reversed) and 67% 
(Double-Reversed). As a result, a return to the Reversed level tasks was deemed 
appropriate per protocol. Mass trial training of the Now-Then relation at the Reversed 
level was conducted until criterion was met. Double-Reversed training again occurred to 
criterion and a post-instructional probe was scored at 100% (Simple), 100% (Reversed), 
and 83% (Double-Reversed). Figure 6 shows the results of Deceptive Container Task 
probes for participant #2. 
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Figure 7. Hinting Task & RSAS Assessments Participant #2 
 Theory of Mind probes were conducted on three occasions (Baseline, Post-
Reversed, and Post-Double-Reversed). Evaluation of levels 4 (true belief) and 5 (false 
belief) were compared by employing the Deceptive Container Task and further 
generalization was assessed by examining performance on the Hinting Task.  On the first 
ToM probe, Participant #2’s performance was 73% (57% at level 4 and 88% at level 5) 
across Deceptive Container Tasks and 43% on the Hinting Task. Following acquisition of 
Reversed deictic relations a second ToM probe was conducted with ToM accuracy 
increasing to 85% (82% at level 4 and 88% at level 5) across Deceptive Container Tasks 
and 50% on the Hinting Task.  A final ToM probe was conducted following the post-
instructional mastery probe performance. Participant #2’s aggregate ToM accuracy was 
82% (82% at level 4 and 82% at level 5) across Deceptive Container Tasks and 77% on 
the Hinting Task.  
 Finally, RSAS probes were also conducted on the same schedule as those 
performed for ToM and resulted in scores of 19/40 (Baseline), 16/40 (Post-Reversed), 
and 18/40 (Post-Double-Reversed). Figure 7 shows the results Hinting Task and RSAS 
probes for participant #2. 
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Participant #3 
 Baseline scores for Participant #3 were first evaluated and yielded the following 
aggregate data: 67% (Simple), 17% (Reversed), and 0% (Double-Reversed). A second 
assessment of baseline performance yielded the following percentages: 0% (Simple), 
17% (Reversed), and 17% (Double-Reversed). A third assessment was performed due to 
the variability between the first and second assessments. The third assessment yielded the 
following percentages: 17% (Simple), 0% (Reversed), and 0% (Double-Reversed). 
Training on Simple relations started with session three and continued for 3 sessions.  A 
post-instructional probe was conducted and resulted in 100% performance across the 
three Simple deictic relations.  
 After training for Simple relations, a baseline probe was conducted for both 
Reversed and Double Reversed relations. There was an increase in Reversed performance 
to 33% (2/6).  Performance on Double-Reversal trials was shown to increase to 50% 
(3/6). Figure 8 shows the results of deictic training for participant #3. 
 Training at the Reversed level of complexity commenced following the fourth 
baseline probe and continued for 4 sessions. As aggregate performance met criteria for 
80% or better to be probed, a post-instructional probe was conducted that resulted in 0% 
(Simple) and 67% (Reversed) correct responding. As a result, a return to the Simple level 
tasks was deemed appropriate per protocol. Criterion was met within one session. 
Reversed training again occurred to criterion and a post-instructional probe was scored at 
100% (Simple) and 100% (Reversed). 
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 Figure 8. Deictic Training Participant #3 
 Following this probe, a final baseline was conducted with Double-Reversed 
relations. Relations at this level tested at 33% accuracy (1/6). Training on these relations 
increased performance to 67% but mastery was not met due to the participant’s early 
withdrawal from the study. Figure 9 shows the results of Deceptive Container Task 
probes for participant #3. 
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 Figure 9. Deceptive Container Task Assessments Participant #3 
 Theory of Mind probes were conducted on two occasions (Baseline and Post-
Reversed). Evaluation of levels 4 (true belief) and 5 (false belief) were compared by 
employing the Deceptive Container Task and further generalization was assessed by 
examining performance on the Hinting Task.  On the first ToM probe, Participant #3’s 
performance was 47% (75% at level 4 and 19% at level 5) across Deceptive Container 
Tasks and 23% on the Hinting Task. Following acquisition of Reversed deictic relations a 
second ToM probe was conducted with ToM accuracy increasing to 60% (75% at level 4 
and 44% at level 5) across Deceptive Container Tasks and 47% on the Hinting Task.  A 
final ToM and Hinting task probe could not be conducted due to the participant’s early 
withdrawal from the study.  
 Finally, RSAS probes were also conducted on the same schedule as those 
performed for ToM and resulted in scores of 22/40 (Baseline) and 20/40 (Post-Reversed). 
Figure 10 shows the results of Hinting Task and RSAS probes for participant #3. 
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Figure 10. Hinting Task & RSAS Assessments Participant #3 
Discussion 
Within subject analyses indicated that the deictic relations believed to be the basic 
units of perspective taking ability can be shaped through operant conditioning to various 
levels of complexity in 3 males diagnosed with Schizophrenia. Performance by all 
participants increased when training was implemented. 
Post-instructional probes involved stimuli that were not directly trained during the 
training phases of any level of complexity. These probes were intended to assess for 
generalization. In the ToM literature, generalization is discussed in terms of near and far 
generalization. Near generalization refers to generalization across materials and far 
generalization to that shown across setting/testing style, and materials.  The focus of this 
study was on the hypothesized underlying relational abilities that contribute to far 
generalization. That is, we were attempting to directly impact perspective taking ability 
through its hypothesized foundation - deictic relational responding. This was a test of far 
generalization in that the Deceptive Container (ToM levels 4 &5) and Hinting Tasks were 
presented in an entirely different format than that of the multiple exemplar tasks (deictic 
relations) during training.   
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All participants showed evidence of improvement on ToM tasks. With the 
increased flexibility in relational repertoire given mastery at the Reversed level, 
improvements are seen at level 4 for participants #1 and #2 while improvement was seen 
at level 5 for participants #1 and #3. Improvements were seen for all 3 participants on the 
Hinting Task. As the participants’ relational repertoire expanded through training on 
Double Reversed relations, participant #1 showed improvement in levels 4 and 5. 
Participant #2 showed no improvement at level 4 and perhaps a very slight decrease at 
level 5. Double Reversed probes were not conducted for participant #3 due to early 
withdrawal from the study. Improvements were seen for participants #1 and #2 on the 
Hinting Task once again.  
A point of interest with regards to particular deictic frames is that, in contrast to 
the findings of Villatte et al. (2008) none of the participants in this study appeared to 
exhibit differential deficits on frames involving I-You relations and yet, 2 participants 
met criteria (a score of 20+ points) on the RSAS, the third falling only 1 point short. In 
support of the Villatte et al. study, all 3 participants showed Hinting Task scores that 
correlated negatively with RSAS scores as deictic responding met mastery criteria at 
increasing levels of complexity. An interesting abstraction from the procedure showed 
that all participants did have difficulty with the temporal (Now-Then) relation. These 
were the only trials in which the stimuli in the scenario (Today-Yesterday) differed from 
the stimuli in the questions (Now-Then). ‘Now’ and ‘today’ are typically in a frame of 
coordination as are ‘then’ and ‘yesterday’ but it is possible that these frames of 
coordination were not adequately established in the repertoires of participants prior to the 
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study. Future studies should consider assessing this prerequisite skill and training their 
coordination if necessary.  
In contrast to Villatte et al. (2010a), participant #2 scored higher on false belief 
(ToM level 5) tasks than on true belief (ToM level 4) tasks. Interestingly, this participant 
also scored higher on reversed deictic relations than he did on simple relations. Although 
this phenomenon was recorded for only one subject, these data suggest that the 
presentation of perspective taking deficits in people with Schizophrenia may differ from 
other populations such as ASD. Further research with larger sample sizes might consider 
addressing this hypothesis. The current study lends support to Villatte et al. (2010b) in 
that performance on the deictic relational protocol predicted performance on the Hinting 
Task. Overall, the findings of this study support the notion that in people diagnosed with 
Schizophrenia, deictic relational responding is predictive of performance on traditional 
ToM tasks including the Deceptive Container Task and Hinting Task. 
Limitations 
An important variable to consider in a study such as this is maturation. The 
multiple probe design utilized in this study does so by showing reliable changes in the 
level and trend of the data following an intervention on one particular behavior or relation 
(Simple relations) while showing no change, little change, or trending in the opposite 
direction of the other behaviors/relations of interest (Reversed and Double Reversed 
relations). Given that probe data for Reversed and Double Reversed relations do not show 
an intervention effect during baseline, another comparison between data series is possible 
when the intervention is applied to each subsequent behavior. If the data again respond to 
the application of the intervention, then there is strong support for functional control.   
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The data generally provide support for functional control within subjects. It is 
possible, however, that a test/re-test effect was observed since the ToM tests were 
identical across three administrations. Appendices III and IV shows examples of the ToM 
and Hinting Task protocols. Taking the test a second and third time might show 
improvement as a result of the effect of taking the test previously (Kazdin, 2003). The 
vignettes were similar across all tests, which could increase this effect. There is also the 
possibility that, because of the nature of Schizophrenia, participants’ responses may have 
been affected by improved rapport throughout the study. Future studies should consider 
the effect of test-retest on the ToM measures collected.  
Rehfeldt et al. (2007) showed very rapid acquisition of double reversed relations 
as compared to fairly lengthy training phases for the single reversed relations. It is 
possible that these results could occur if the participant is not responding relationally but 
rather simply following a rule. The use of randomly rotated questions from all levels of 
complexity (only those previously mastered) during post-instructional probes was used as 
a means to reduce the chance that participants would simply follow a rule or respond to 
the direct discriminative aspects of the vocal statements and echo them. A second 
measure was implemented in order to further reduce the chance that participants were 
following a rule. During Double-Reversed training participants were required to respond 
correctly at both Simple and Reversed levels before the Double-Reversed level was 
presented. This process functioned not only to maintain the previously mastered levels of 
responding but to set the occasion for a second reversal of deictic frames at the Double 
Reversed level of responding. 
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A final limitation to this study is that all 3 participants had a dual diagnosis of 
Schizophrenia and mild-moderate Mental Retardation. The extent to which each of these 
diagnoses contributed to the perspective taking ability of participants remains unclear. 
Further research might target participants diagnosed with a Schizophrenia Spectrum 
Disorder who do not have a concurrent diagnosis of Mental Retardation. 
Conclusion 
 Few studies to date have attempted to operationalize perspective taking in the 
behavioral literature and only a handful have targeted changes in deictic relational 
deficits. The only published studies to date that incorporate the McHugh protocol in a 
training situation (Heagle & Rehfeldt, 2006; Rehfeldt et al., 2007; Weil et al., 2011) have 
done so with a population of typically developing children (4-11 years). The present 
study is the first to target these skills in people diagnosed with Schizophrenia and Mental 
Retardation. Furthermore, previous studies did not conduct assessment of Hinting Task 
performance after deictic training, so the relationship between performance on the 
Hinting Task and improvement in deictic relational responding was unclear.  The results 
of this study suggest that improvements in performance on the Hinting Task may have 
been influenced by training on the deictic relational protocol.  That is, these data provide 
experimental support for the notion that deictic relational frames are a necessary 
component in the remediation of perspective taking ability in people diagnosed with 
Schizophrenia.  
 Finally, future studies should address the role of perspective taking in other 
behaviors commonly associated with Schizophrenia such as delusions and hallucinations. 
It is possible that a weak perspective taking ability has some mediating and/or 
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moderating effect on the development of delusions and hallucinations. For example, in 
the case of auditory hallucinations, a person is unable to accurately identify the source 
and believability of their own covert verbal behavior. Training on deictic relational 
responding might be expanded to address this and other behavioral deficits and excesses 
commonly associated with Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders. Specific to the 
participants in this study, it is also possible that long term deictic training may have some 
effect on sex offenders’ understanding of their victim’s traumatic experience and may 
serve as an abolishing operation for inappropriate sexual behaviors. The long term 
implications of remediation are the eventual reduction or discontinuation of antipsychotic 
medication regimens and reintegration of people with Schizophrenia as typically 
functioning members of society. 
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Appendix I-Deictic Relational Protocol 
The Perspective taking Protocol to be employed in this experiment. The correct response 
for each question is shown in parentheses. (Adapted from McHugh et al., 2004.) 
 
SIMPLE RELATIONS 
Simple I-YOU: 
I have a red brick and you have a green brick. 
Which brick do I have? (Red) 
Which brick do YOU have? (Green) 
 
I have a green brick and you have a red brick. 
Which brick do YOU have? (Red) 
Which brick do I have? (Green) 
 
Simple HERE-THERE: 
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. 
Where am I sitting? (Blue) 
Where are YOU sitting? (Black) 
 
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting here on the blue chair. 
Where are YOU sitting? (Blue) 
Where am I sitting? (Black) 
 
Simple NOW-THEN: 
Yesterday I was watching television, today I am reading. 
What am I doing now? (Reading) 
What was I doing then? (Television) 
 
Yesterday I was reading, today I am watching television. 
What was I doing then? (Reading) 
What am I doing now? (Television) 
 
Yesterday you were reading, today you are watching television. 
What are YOU doing now? (Television) 
What were YOU doing then? (Reading) 
 
Yesterday you were watching television, today you are reading. 
What were YOU doing then? (Television) 
What are YOU doing now? (Reading) 
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REVERSED RELATIONS 
Reversed I-YOU: 
I have a red brick and you have a green brick. If I was you and you were me. 
Which brick would I have? (Green) 
Which brick would YOU have? (Red) 
 
I have a green brick and you have a red brick. If I was you and you were me 
Which brick would YOU have? (Green) 
Which brick would I have? (Red) 
 
I have a red brick and you have a green brick. If I was you and you were me. 
Which brick would YOU have? (Red) 
Which brick would I have? (Green) 
 
I have a green brick and you have a red brick. If I was you and you were me 
Which brick would I have? (Red) 
Which brick would YOU have? (Green) 
 
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If I was 
you and you were me. 
Where would YOU be sitting? (Black) 
Where would I be sitting? (Blue) 
 
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If I was 
you and you were me. 
Where would I be sitting? (Blue) 
Where would YOU be sitting? (Black) 
 
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was 
you and you were me. 
Where would I be sitting? (Black) 
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue) 
 
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was 
you and you were me. 
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue) 
Where would I be sitting? (Black) 
 
Reversed HERE-THERE: 
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If here was 
there and there was here. 
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue) 
Where would I be sitting? (Black) 
 
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If here was 
there and there was here. 
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Where would I be sitting? (Blue) 
Where would YOU be sitting? (Black) 
 
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If here was 
there and there was here. 
Where would I be sitting? (Black) 
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue) 
 
 
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If here was 
there and there was her. 
Where would YOU be sitting? (Black) 
Where would I be sitting? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. 
If here was there and there was here. 
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue) 
Where was I sitting then? (Black) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair. 
If here was there and there was here. 
Where was I sitting then? (Blue) 
Where would I be sitting now? (Black) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. 
If here was there and there was here. 
Where was I sitting then? (Black) 
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair. 
If here was there and there was here. 
Where would I be sitting now? (Black) 
Where was I sitting then? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black 
chair. If here was there and there was here. 
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue) 
Where were you sitting then? (Black) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black 
chair. If here was there and there was here. 
Where were you sitting then? (Black) 
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting there on the black chair, today you are sitting here on the blue 
chair. If here was there and there was here. 
51 
 
Where would you be sitting now? (Black) 
Where were you sitting hen? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting here on the black chair, today you are sitting there on the blue 
chair. If here was there and there was here. 
Where were you sitting then? (Blue) 
Where would you be sitting now? (Black) 
 
Reversed NOW-THEN: 
Yesterday I was watching television, today I am reading. If now was then and then was 
now. 
What was I doing then? (Reading) 
What would I be doing now? (Television) 
 
Yesterday I was reading, today I am watching television. If now was then and then was 
now. 
What would I be doing now? (Reading) 
What was I doing then? (Television) 
 
Yesterday I was watching television, today I am reading. If now was then and then was 
now. 
What was I doing now? (Television) 
What would I be doing then? (Reading) 
 
Yesterday I was reading, today I am watching television. If now was then and then was 
now. 
What was I doing then? (Television) 
What would I be doing now? (Reading) 
 
Yesterday you were watching television, today you are reading. If now was then and then 
was now. 
What were you doing then? (Reading) 
What would you be doing now? (Television) 
 
Yesterday you were reading, today you are watching television. If now was then and then 
was now. 
What were you doing then? (Television) 
What would you be doing now? (Reading) 
 
Yesterday you were watching television, today you are reading. If now was then and then 
was now. 
What would you be doing now? (Television) 
What were you doing then? (Reading) 
 
Yesterday you were reading, today you are watching television. If now was then and then 
was now. 
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What would you be doing now? (Reading) 
What were you doing then? (Television) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. 
If now was then and then was now. 
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue) 
Where was I sitting then? (Black) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. 
If now was then and then was now. 
Where was I sitting then? (Black) 
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair. 
If now was then and then was now. 
Where would I be sitting now? (Black) 
Where was I sitting then? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair. 
If now was then and then was now. 
Where was I sitting then? (Blue) 
Where would I be sitting now? (Black) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black 
chair. If now was then and then was now. 
Where were you sitting then? (Black) 
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black 
chair. If now was then and then was now. 
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue) 
Where were you sitting then? (Black) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting there on the black chair, today you are sitting here on the blue 
chair. If now was then and then was now. 
Where were you sitting then? (Blue) 
Where would you be sitting now? (Black) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting there on the black chair, today you are sitting here on the blue 
chair. If now was then and then was now. 
Where would you be sitting now? (Black) 
Where were you sitting then? (Blue) 
 
DOUBLE REVERSED RELATIONS 
I-YOU/HERE-THERE: 
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I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was 
you and you were me and If here was there and there was here. 
Where would I be sitting? (Blue)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Where would YOU be sitting? (Black) 
 
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If I was 
you and you were me and If here was there and there was here. 
Where would I be sitting? (Black) 
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue) 
 
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was 
you and you were me and If here was there and there was here. 
Where YOU be sitting? (Black) 
Where would I be sitting? (Blue) 
 
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If I was 
you and you were me and If here was there and there was here. 
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue) 
Where would I be sitting? (Black) 
 
 
HERE-THERE/NOW-THEN: 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. 
If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now. 
Where would I be sitting then? (Blue) 
Where would I be sitting now? (Black) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. 
If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now. 
Where would I be sitting now? (Black) 
Where would I be sitting then? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair. 
If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now. 
Where would I be sitting then? (Black) 
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair. 
If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now. 
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue) 
Where would I be sitting then? (Black) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black 
chair. If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now. 
Where would you be sitting then? (Blue) 
Where would you be sitting now? (Black) 
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Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black 
chair. If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now. 
Where would you be sitting now? (Black) 
Where would you be sitting then? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting there on the black chair, today you are sitting here on the blue 
chair. If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now. 
Where would you be sitting then? (Black) 
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue) 
 
Yesterday you were sitting there on the black chair, today you are sitting here on the blue 
chair. If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now. 
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue) 
Where would you be sitting then? (Black) 
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Appendix II-Revised Social Anhedonia Scale 
 
Please answer each item true or false.  Please do not skip any items.  It is important that 
you answer every item, even if you are not quite certain which the best answer is.  Some 
items may sound like others, but all of them are slightly different.  Answer each item 
individually, and don't worry about how you answered a somewhat similar previous item. 
 
Write down either:    True OR     False  
 
1. Having close friends is not as important as many people say. 
2. I attach very little importance to having close friends. 
3. I prefer watching television to going out with other people. 
4. A car ride is much more enjoyable if someone is with me. 
5. I like to make long distance phone calls to friends and relatives. 
6. Playing with children is a real chore. 
7. I have always enjoyed looking at photographs of friends. 
8. Although there are things that I enjoy doing by myself, I usually seem to have 
more fun when I do things with other people. 
9. I sometimes become deeply attached to people I spend a lot of time with. 
10. People sometimes think that I am shy when I really just want to be left alone. 
11. When things are going really good for my close friends, it makes me feel good 
too. 
12. When someone close to me is depressed, it brings me down also. 
13. My emotional responses seem very different from those of other people. 
14. When I am alone, I often resent people telephoning me or knocking on my door. 
15. Just being with friends can make me feel really good. 
16. When things are bothering me, I like to talk to other people about it.  
17. I prefer hobbies and leisure activities that do not involve other people. 
18. It's fun to sing with other people. 
19. Knowing that I have friends who care about me gives me a sense of security. 
20. When I move to a new city, I feel a strong need to make new friends. 
21. People are usually better off if they stay aloof from emotional involvements with 
most others. 
22. Although I know I should have affection for certain people, I don't really feel it. 
23. People often expect me to spend more time talking with them than I would like. 
24. I feel pleased and gratified as I learn more and more about the emotional life of 
my friends. 
25. When others try to tell me about their problems and hang-ups, I usually listen 
with interest and attention. 
26. I never had really close friends in high school. 
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27. I am usually content to just sit alone, thinking and daydreaming. 
28. I'm much too independent to really get involved with other people. 
29. There are few things more tiring than to have a long, personal discussion with 
someone. 
30. It made me sad to see all my high school friends go their separate ways when high 
school was over. 
31. I have often found it hard to resist talking to a good friend, even when I have 
other things to do. 
32. Making new friends isn't worth the energy it takes. 
33. There are things that are more important to me than privacy. 
34. People who try to get to know me better usually give up after awhile. 
35. I could be happy living all alone in a cabin in the woods or mountains. 
36. If given the choice, I would much rather be with others than be alone. 
37. I find that people too often assume that their daily activities and opinions will be 
interesting to me. 
38. I don't really feel very close to my friends. 
39. My relationships with other people never get very intense. 
40. In many ways, I prefer the company of pets to the company of people. 
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Appendix III-Deceptive Container Task 
 
The following statements are to be read to participants from cards. The participant is then 
asked if they think the entire statement is true or false. There are 24 true belief tasks 
(Theory of Mind level 4) and 24 false belief tasks (Theory of Mind level 5) for a total of 
48 belief attribution tasks. 
 
True Belief to Self 
1. If I put the pencils in the chalk box and you are not here, you would think the 
chalk box contains chalk. (True) 
2. If I put the pencils in the chalk box and you are here, you would think the chalk 
box contains pencils. (True) 
3. If I put the chalk in the chalk box and you are not here, you would think the chalk 
box contains chalk. (True) 
4. If I put the chalk in the chalk box and you are here, you would think the chalk box 
contains chalk. (True) 
5. If I put the crayons in the cigarettes box and you are not here, you would think the 
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True) 
6. If I put the crayons in the cigarettes box and you are here, you would think the 
cigarettes box contains crayons. (True) 
7. If I put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and you are not here, you would think 
the cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True) 
8. If I put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and you are here, you would think the 
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True) 
9. If I put the cigarettes in the crayons box and you are not here, you would think the 
crayons box contains crayons. (True) 
10. If I put the cigarettes in the crayons box and you are here, you would think the 
crayons box contains cigarettes. (True) 
11. If I put the crayons in the crayons box and you are not here, you would think the 
crayons box contains crayons. (True) 
12. If I put the crayons in the crayons box and you are here, you would think the 
crayons box contains crayons. (True) 
True Belief to Another 
1. If you put the pencils in the chalk box and I am not here, I would think the chalk 
box contains chalk. (True) 
2. If you put the pencils in the chalk box and I am here, I would think the chalk box 
contains pencils. (True) 
3. If you put the chalk in the chalk box and I am not here, I would think the chalk 
box contains chalk. (True) 
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4. If you put the chalk in the chalk box and I am here, I would think the chalk box 
contains chalk. (True) 
5. If you put the crayons in the cigarettes box and I am not here, I would think the 
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True) 
6. If you put the crayons in the cigarettes box and I am here, I would think the 
cigarettes box contains crayons. (True) 
7. If you put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and I am not here, I would think the 
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True) 
8. If you put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and I am here, I would think the 
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True) 
9. If you put the cigarettes in the crayons box and I am not here, I would think the 
crayons box contains crayons. (True) 
10. If you put the cigarettes in the crayons box and I am here, I would think the 
crayons box contains cigarettes. (True) 
11. If you put the crayons in the crayons box and I am not here, I would think the 
crayons box contains crayons. (True) 
12. If you put the crayons in the crayons box and I am here, I would think the crayons 
box contains crayons. (True) 
False Belief to Self 
1. If I put the pencils in the chalk box and you are here, you would think the chalk 
box contains chalk. (False) 
2. If I put the pencils in the chalk box and you are not here, you would think the 
chalk box contains pencils. (False) 
3. If I put the chalk in the chalk box and you are not here, you would think the chalk 
box contains pencils. (False) 
4. If I put the chalk in the chalk box and you are here, you would think the chalk box 
contains pencils. (False) 
5. If I put the crayons in the cigarettes box and you are here, you would think the 
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (False) 
6. If I put the crayons in the cigarettes box and you are not here, you would think the 
cigarettes box contains crayons. (False) 
7. If I put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and you are not here, you would think 
the cigarettes box contains crayons. (False) 
8. If I put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and you are here, you would think the 
cigarettes box contains crayons. (False) 
9. If I put the cigarettes in the crayons box and you are here, you would think the 
crayons box contains crayons. (False) 
10. If I put the cigarettes in the crayons box and you are not here, you would think the 
crayons box contains cigarettes. (False) 
11. If I put the crayons in the crayons box and you are not here, you would think the 
crayons box contains cigarettes. (False) 
12. If I put the crayons in the crayons box and you are here, you would think the 
crayons box contains cigarettes. (False) 
False Belief to Another 
1. If you put the pencils in the chalk box and I am here, I would think the chalk box 
contains chalk. (False) 
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2. If you put the pencils in the chalk box and I am not here, I would think the chalk 
box contains pencils. (False) 
3. If you put the chalk in the chalk box and I am not here, I would think the chalk 
box contains pencils. (False) 
4. If you put the chalk in the chalk box and I am here, I would think the chalk box 
contains pencils. (False) 
5. If you put the crayons in the cigarettes box and I am here, I would think the 
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (False) 
6. If you put the crayons in the cigarettes box and I am not here, I would think the 
cigarettes box contains crayons. (False) 
7. If you put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and I am not here, I would think the 
cigarettes box contains crayons. (False) 
8. If you put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and I am here, I would think the 
cigarettes box contains crayons. (False) 
9. If you put the cigarettes in the crayons box and I am here, I would think the 
crayons box contains crayons. (False) 
10. If you put the cigarettes in the crayons box and I am not here, I would think the 
crayons box contains cigarettes. (False) 
11. If you put the crayons in the crayons box and I am not here, I would think the 
crayons box contains cigarettes. (False) 
12. If you put the crayons in the crayons box and I am here, I would think the crayons 
box contains cigarettes. (False) 
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Appendix IV-Hinting Task 
 
The following 10 hinting tasks have been developed for participants based on relevant 
scenarios in the participant’s environment in order to ensure that the task is applicable to 
daily living. Participants will be able to score a maximum of 3 points per scenario (2 
points for a correct first answer, 1 point for a correct second answer, and 0 points for an 
incorrect answer).  
 
1. “Paul says to his friend George: ‘I can’t afford groceries. Could you lend me 
some money? George answers: I have to buy groceries too.” 
Question 1: “What does Paul really mean when he says this?” 
“George then says: The groceries I want are going to be very expensive.” 
Question 2: “What does George want to say to Paul?” 
Correct response: No, I cannot lend you any money. 
 
2. “Paul has to go to a job interview and he’s running late. While he is cleaning his 
shoes, he says to his wife, Jane: “I want to wear my blue shirt but it’s very 
creased.”  
Question 1: “What does Paul really mean when he says this?”  
“Paul then says: It’s in the ironing basket.”  
Question 2: “What does Paul want Jane to do?” 
Correct response: Paul wants Jane to iron his blue shirt. 
 
3. "George has been on the phone with his friend for over an hour. George says: My 
mother ought to call me in few minutes” 
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?” 
“George then says: I could call you back tomorrow.”  
Question 2: “What does George want to do?” 
Correct response: George wants to hang up the phone. 
 
4. “Paul is watching his favorite tv show with George. George says: The big game is 
about to start on channel 13.” 
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?” 
“George then says: I’d really like to see the game.” 
Question 2: “What does George want Paul to do?” 
Correct response: George wants Paul to change the channel. 
 
5. “Paul is going to the casino tonight and asks George if he would like to go too. 
George says: I went to the casino last week.” 
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?” 
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“George then says: My paycheck doesn’t come in until tomorrow.” 
Question 2: “What does George want to say to Paul?” 
Correct response: George wants to say that he doesn’t want to go to the casino. 
 
6. “Paul is listening to music on the van’s radio. George says: I have a headache.” 
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?” 
“George then says: The music is very loud” 
Question 2: “What does George want Paul to do?” 
Correct response: George wants Paul to turn the radio down/off. 
 
7. “Paul is smoking on the porch. George says to Paul: I ran out of cigarettes.” 
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?” 
“George then says: I could really go for a smoke right now” 
Question 2: “What does George want Paul to do?” 
Correct response: George wants Paul to give him a cigarette. 
 
8. “Paul is walking around the yard in the sun. George says to Paul: You’ve been 
out there for an hour.” 
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?” 
“George then says: The sun is going to burn you’re skin” 
Question 2: “What does George want Paul to do?” 
Correct response: George wants Paul to go inside. 
 
9. “Paul is talking to George about personal things in a restaurant. George says to 
Paul: I think we’re bothering people.” 
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?” 
“George then says: This is making me uncomfortable” 
Question 2: “What does George want Paul to do?” 
Correct response: George wants Paul to stop talking to himself. 
 
10. “Paul and George are arguing about who is better, the Red Sox or the Rays. 
George says to Paul: the Red Sox beat the Yankees and the Yankees beat the 
Rays. 
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?” 
“George then says: The Yankees weren’t even at their best when they beat the 
Rays” 
Question 2: “What does George want to say to Paul?” 
Correct response: George wants to tell Paul that the Red Sox will beat the Rays. 
